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Abstract
One of the ways to model contraction functions for belief sets is epistemic entrenchment. The
first step was provided by Gärdenfors in [5], who defined epistemic entrenchment and a contraction
function in terms of it and related the latter with the AGM contraction function. Later Hans Rott
in [16] presented an entrenchment based contraction function that does not satisfy recovery. In this
paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of Rott Contraction.1
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1 Introduction
“Even if all sentences in a knowledge set are accepted or considered as facts, this
does not means that all sentences are of equal value for planning or problem solving
purposes. Certain pieces of knowledge and belief about the world are more important
than others when planning future actions, conducting scientific investigations or
reasoning in general. We will say that some sentences in a knowledge system have
a higher degree of epistemic entrenchment than others. The degree of entrenchment
will, intuitively, have a bearing on what is abandoned from a knowledge set and what
is retained, when a contraction or revision is carried out.” [6]
This is the key idea of epistemic entrenchment introduced by Gärdenfors in [5].
Using epistemic entrenchment, Gärdenfors defines an operation of contraction that
satisfies the entire set of AGM contraction postulates [5, 6].
However, epistemic entrenchment also allows us to define entrenchment based con-
traction functions that do not satisfy all the AGM postulates. One of the more
important such functions in the literature was proposed by Hans Rott in [16] and
has been called Rott contraction. This contraction differs from the Gärdenfors con-
traction in not satisfying the controversial postulate of recovery. For discussions of
recovery see [3, 12, 9, 10, 11, 7, 15, 14, 13]. In [11] Lindström and Rabinowicz suggest
that any realistic entrenchment-based contraction operator should lie between those
of Rott and Gärdenfors.
1Full version of a contributed paper presented at the 4th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Compu-
tation (WoLLIC’97), http://www.di.ufpe.br/∼ wollic97, held in Fortaleza (Ceará), Brazil, August 19–22 1997, with
scientific sponsorship by IGPL, FoLLI and ASL, and organised by Univ. Federal do Ceará (UFC) and Univ. Federal
de Pernambuco (UFPE).
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We give here an axiomatic characterization for Rott’s entrenchment-based contraction
operator, i.e. a characterization of the lower limit of what Lindström and Rabinowicz
regard as reasonable contraction.
In Section 2 we recall AGM contraction functions, introduce epistemic entrench-
ment, relate it to AGM contraction, and also present Rott contraction. In Section 3
we provide the promised axiomatic characterization of Rott contraction. Proofs are
in the appendix.
After this work was finished we were informed that another axiomatic character-
ization has been independently obtained by Hans Rott and Maurice Pagnucco and
will be published in a joint paper by these authors [17].
2 Background
2.1 AGM contraction
The logic of theory change was introduced into philosophical logic and artificial
intelligence a little over a decade ago. The initial step was provided by Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors and Makinson in [1] (commonly called the AGM model). Basically, in the
AGM model the beliefs of a rational agent are represented by a belief set K, closed
under logical consequence Cn, where Cn satisfies the Tarski conditions K ⊆ Cn(K)
for any set K of propositions, Cn(Cn(K)) ⊆ Cn(K) and Cn(K) ⊆ Cn(H) if K ⊆ H
. We assume that Cn includes classical logical consequence, satisfies the rule of
introduction of disjunction into premises and is compact. We write ` x for x ∈ Cn(∅).
A theory is understood to be any set K of proposition closed under Cn, i.e. such
that Cn(K) = K.
Let L be the set of all the sentences of the language. Let K the set of all theories
of the language. The expansion function + from K×L to K is defined by (K + x) =
Cn(K ∪ {x}). The postulates for the AGM contraction are:
(K − 1) K− x is a theory whenever K is a theory (closure)
(K − 2) K− x ⊆ K (inclusion)
(K − 3) If x 6∈ K, then K − x = K (vacuity)
(K − 4) If x 6∈ Cn(∅) , then x 6∈ K − x (success)
(K − 5) If x ↔ y ∈ Cn(∅) then K − x = K − y (extensionality)
(K − 6) K ⊆ (K − x) + x whenever K is a theory (recovery)
(K − 7) K− x ∩ K− y ⊆ K − (x ∧ y) (conjunctive overlap)
(K − 8) If x 6∈ K− (x∧ y), then K− (x∧ y) ⊆ K−x (conjunctive inclusion).
2.2 Epistemic entrenchment
The idea of entrenchment for theories was introduced by Gärdenfors in [5] to
represent formally a preference ordering between formulae in a theory. He attempted
to define the contraction of a theory by a sentence in terms of an order of the
sentences, and identify the properties that the order must satisfy for the generated
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contraction to satisfy the AGM postulates.
Gärdenfors proposed the following set of axioms for the order among sentences:
(EE1) If x ≤K y and y ≤K z, then x ≤K z (transitivity)
(EE2) If x ` y, then x ≤K y (dominance)
(EE3) x ≤K (x ∧ y) or y ≤K (x ∧ y) (conjunctiveness)
(EE4) If K 6= K⊥, then x 6∈ K if and only if x ≤K y for all y (minimality)
(EE5) If y ≤K x for all y, then ` x (maximality)
A relation satisfying (EE1) − (EE5) is a standard entrenchment ordering. Fur-
thermore, he showed that entrenchment orderings can be connected with contraction
functions by the following equivalences 2:
(C ≤) x ≤K y if and only if x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y) or ` (x ∧ y).
Gärdenfors’ entrenchment-based contraction
(−G) y ∈ K−x if and only if y ∈ K and, either ` x or x <K (x ∨ y).
Observation 2.1 ([5, 6]) Let ≤K be a standard entrenchment ordering on a consis-
tent belief set K. Furthermore let −G be the Gärdenfors entrenchment-based contrac-
tion on K defined by condition (−G) from ≤K. Then −G satisfies the eight AGM
postulates, and (C ≤) also holds.
Observation 2.2 ([5, 6]) Let − be an operation on a consistent belief set K that
satisfies the eight AGM postulates. Furthermore let ≤K be the relation defined from
− by condition (C ≤). Then ≤K satisfies the standard entrenchment postulates and
(−G) also holds.
Hans Rott [16] has remarked that the comparison x <K (x ∨ y) is not intuitive,
and proposed the following alternative definition of a contraction operation from an
entrenchment ordering:
Rott’s entrenchment-based contraction
(−R) y ∈ K−x if and only if y ∈ K and, either ` x or x <K y.
Rott also provided the following result:
Observation 2.3 Let ≤K be a standard entrenchment ordering on a consistent belief
set K. Furthermore let −R be the Rott entrenchment-based contraction on K defined by
condition (−R) from ≤K. Then −R satisfies all the AGM postulates except recovery.
Rott [16, p. 169] proved that for all x, K−Rx ⊆ K−Gx. Lindström and Rabinowicz
[11] have proposed that a reasonable entrenchment based contraction operation −
should lie between Rott’s operation and Gärdenfors’ operation, in the sense that
K −R x ⊆ K− x ⊆ K −G x.
2We write x <K y to denote x ≤K y and y 6≤K x.
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3 An axiomatic characterization of Rott contraction
In section 2.2 we recalled that Hans Rott proved that his contraction satisfies all the
AGM postulates except recovery. In this section we provide it with an axiomatic
characterization. We make use of the following postulates:
If K− (x ∧ y) ⊆ K − y then y 6∈ K−x or ` x or ` y (Converse Conjunctive
Inclusion).
If x ∈ Cn(∅) then K−x = K (Failure) [4].
If x 6∈ K−y then K−y ⊆ K−x (Strong Inclusion)
Now we can characterize Rott Contraction in terms of postulates:
Theorem 3.1
1. Let ≤K be a standard entrenchment ordering on a consistent belief set K. Further-
more, let −R be Rott’s entrenchment-based contraction on K, defined from ≤K
by condition (−R). Then −R satisfies closure, inclusion, success, extensionality,
conjunctive overlap, failure, strong inclusion and converse conjunctive inclusion,
and (C ≤) also holds.
2. Let − be an operation on a consistent belief set K that satisfies closure, inclusion,
success, extensionality, conjunctive overlap, failure, strong inclusion and converse
conjunctive inclusion. Furthermore let ≤K be the relation that is defined from −
by (C ≤). Then ≤K satisfies the standard entrenchment postulates, and (−R) also
holds.
Other interesting postulates are:
If 6` x and 6` y, then either x 6∈ K−y or y 6∈ K−x (Expulsiveness)[8].
K−(x ∧ y) = K−x or K−(x ∧ y) = K−y (Linear Hierarchical Ordering)
K−y ⊆ K−x or K−x ⊆ K−y (Linearity)
The following relations hold:
Observation 3.2 Let K be a belief set and − an operator from K× L to K. Then:
1. If − satisfies strong inclusion then it satisfies conjunctive inclusion.
2. If − satisfies inclusion, failure and strong inclusion then it satisfies vacuity.
3. If − satisfies closure, success and strong inclusion then it satisfies expulsiveness.
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4. If − satisfies inclusion, failure, strong inclusion and expulsiveness then it satisfies
linearity.
5. If − satisfies closure, success, extensionality and strong inclusion then it satisfies
linear hierarchical ordering.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Part 1: Closure, inclusion, success, extensionality and conjunctive overlap follow
from observation 2.3.
Converse conjunctive inclusion: Let K−(x ∧ y) ⊆ K−y. We have two cases: 1.
y ∈ K−y: It follows from success that ` y. 2. y 6∈ K−y: then y 6∈ K−(x ∧ y). It
follows from (−R) that y 6∈ K or (y ≤K x ∧ y and 6` x ∧ y). We have two subcases
2.1. y 6∈ K: then by inclusion (see observation 2.3) y 6∈ K−x. 2.2. y ∈ K: then
y ≤K x ∧ y. By (EE2) x ∧ y ≤K x and by (EE1) y ≤K x hence by (−R) y 6∈ K−x
or ` x .
Failure: It follows trivially, since if ` x, then by (−R) y ∈ K−x if and only
if y ∈ K.
Strong inclusion: Let x 6∈ K−y. By (−R) x 6∈ K or (6` y and x ≤K y).
We have two subcases: 1. x 6∈ K: then K−x = K (since by observation 2.3, −
satisfies vacuity); then K−y ⊆ K−x (since by observation 2.3, − satisfies inclusion).
2. x ∈ K: then (6` y and x ≤K y) Let z ∈ K−y, then (by (−R)) z ∈ K and y <K z.
By (EE1) x <K z then by (−R) z ∈ K−x hence K−y ⊆ K−x.
(C ≤)3: For one direction let x ≤K y and x ∈ K−(x ∧ y). We need to prove
` x ∧ y. By (−R) we have: x ∈ K−(x ∧ y) if and only if x ∈ K and either ` x ∧ y
or x ∧ y <K x. Therefore: ` x ∧ y or x ∧ y <K x. Let x ∧ y <K x: then, by (EE3),
y ≤K x ∧ y; and since x ≤K y, we have by (EE1) that x ≤K (x∧ y), contradiction,
hence ` x ∧ y.
For the second direction we have two subcases: 1. x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y): Then by (−R),
x 6∈ K or 6` x and x ≤K x ∧ y. If x 6∈ K, x ≤K y follows (by (EE4)). If x ≤K x ∧ y,
by (EE1), (since by (EE2) x ∧ y ≤K y), x ≤K y. 2. ` x ∧ y, then ` y, hence by
(EE2), x ≤K y. This completes the proof.
3The idea for this proof was provided by an anonymous referee.
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Part 2: (EE2) − (EE5) are proved by Gärdenfors and Makinson from closure,
inclusion, success, extensionality, failure and (C ≤) in [6], pp. 93-94.
• (EE1)
We demonstrate by reductio ad absurdum. Let x ≤K y, y ≤K z and x 6≤K z.
It follows by (C ≤) that: (a) either ` x ∧ y or x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y); (b) either ` y ∧ z or
y 6∈ K−(y ∧ z); and (c) 6` x∧ z and x ∈ K−(x ∧ z).
1. Let ` x ∧ y: then ` x and ` y. By closure y ∈ K−(y ∧ z), then by condition (b)
` y ∧ z, so ` z, and ` x ∧ z; contradiction.
2. Let ` y ∧ z: then ` y and ` z. By closure z ∈ K−(x ∧ z), then by condition (c)
and closure x ∧ z ∈ K−(x ∧ z); hence by success ` x ∧ z; contradiction.
By 1. and 2. (a), (b) and (c) are reduced to x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y), y 6∈ K−(y ∧ z), 6` x ∧ z
and x ∈ K−(x ∧ z).
3. By strong inclusion K−(x ∧ y) ⊆ K−x, then by converse conjunctive inclusion
we have ` x or ` y or x 6∈ K−y. But since x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y) and y 6∈ K−(y ∧ z), by
closure 6` x and 6` y. Then x 6∈ K−y and by strong inclusion we have K−y ⊆ K−x.
4. y 6∈ K−(y ∧ z) implies by strong inclusion that K−(y ∧ z) ⊆ K−y, then by
converse conjunctive inclusion we have ` y or ` z or y 6∈ K−z; by closure 6` y and
6` z (since by success, closure and condition (C), z 6∈ K−(x ∧ z)). Then y 6∈ K−z
and by strong inclusion we have K−z ⊆ K−y.
5. It follows from success that z 6∈ K−z, so by closure (x ∧ z) 6∈ K−z; and
since z 6∈ K−(x ∧ z) we obtain by strong inclusion that K−z = K−(x ∧ z). So
x ∈ K−(x ∧ z) = K−z ⊆ K−y ⊆ K−x. Hence by success ` x; contradiction.
• −R
⇒)
Let y ∈ K−x and 6` x. It follows by inclusion that y ∈ K. We have two
cases: 1. ` y: By closure y ∈ K−(x ∧ y), then by (C ≤), y 6≤K x. By success and
closure x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y); then, by (C ≤), x ≤K y. Hence x <K y.
2. 6` y: By converse conjunctive inclusion K−(x ∧ y) 6⊆ K−y, then by strong inclu-
sion y ∈ K−(x ∧ y); then by (C ≤), y 6≤K x. By success and closure x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y);
then, by (C ≤), x ≤K y. Hence x <K y.
⇐)
1. Let y ∈ K and ` x. By failure K−x = K then y ∈ K−x.
2. Let y ∈ K and x <K y. By (C ≤) x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y), then by strong inclusion
K−(x ∧ y). For reductio ad absurdum let y 6∈ K−x; then y 6∈ K−(x ∧ y) then by
(C ≤), y ≤K x. Contradiction.
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Proof of Observation 3.2
1. If − satisfies strong inclusion then it satisfies conjunctive inclusion:
Let x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y). Then by strong inclusion K−(x ∧ y) ⊆ K−x.
2. If − satisfies inclusion, failure and strong inclusion then it satisfies vacuity:
Let x 6∈ K and ` y. Then by failure x 6∈ K−y = K; by strong inclusion
K = K−y ⊆ K−x. Hence by inclusion K−x = K.
3. If − satisfies closure, success and strong inclusion then it satisfies expulsiveness:
Let 6` x and 6` y. By closure and success x ∧ y 6∈ K−x and x ∧ y 6∈ K−y, then by
strong inclusion K−x ⊆ K−(x ∧ y) and K−y ⊆ K−(x ∧ y). Let y ∈ K−x, then
y ∈ K−(x ∧ y), then by success x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y); hence x 6∈ K−y.
4. If − satisfies inclusion, failure, strong inclusion and expulsiveness then it satisfies
linearity:
If ` x then by failure K−x = K, and by inclusion K−y ⊆ K−x. By the same
reasoning if ` y then K−x ⊆ K−y. Let 6` x and 6` y, then by expulsiveness
y 6∈ K−x or x 6∈ K−y. Hence by strong inclusion K−x ⊆ K−y or K−y ⊆ K−x.
5. If − satisfies closure, success, extensionality and strong inclusion then it satisfies
linear hierarchical ordering:
If ` x or ` y then ` (x ∧ y) ↔ x or ` (x ∧ y ↔ y), then by extensionality
K−(x ∧ y) = K−x or K−(x ∧ y) = K−y. Let 6` x and 6` y. By closure and success
x ∧ y 6∈ K−x and x ∧ y 6∈ K−y, then by strong inclusion K−x ⊆ K−(x ∧ y) and
K−y ⊆ K−(x ∧ y). By success x 6∈ K−(x ∧ y) or y 6∈ K−(x ∧ y). Then by strong
inclusion K−x ⊆ K−(x ∧ y) or K−y ⊆ K−(x ∧ y) Hence K−(x ∧ y) = K−x or
K−(x ∧ y) = K−y.
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